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COMMENT
THE MORTGAGE SUBSIDY BOND TAX ACT OF 1980: A
STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
JOSEPH EDWARD BROADUS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1940, 56.4% of all housing units in America were rented; by
1980, the share of rental units had dropped to 33 %.1 In the final
quarter of 1980, 53 million American households owned their own
homes with 34 million of them making mortgage payments.' Fur-
thermore, 1.5 million new homes are expected to be constructed
yearly during the 1980's.8 As a result of this growth, the nation's
housing stock has been estimated currently to be worth $1.9 tril-
lion, or about 37% of the value of the nation's capital stock.4 The
federal government is estimated to either guarantee or insure ap-
proximately 18% of all mortgages in any given year.
The government's most significant contribution to home owner-
ship may well be in the area of tax policy where it has encouraged
both home construction and ownership by a system of tax prefer-
ences.' This policy would make the tax benefits the largest tax "ex-
penditure" and the second largest federal "entitlement program"
after social security.7
In 1980, without much fanfare, a Democratically-controlled Sen-
ate acquiesced to a House proposal and passed the Mortgage Sub-
* J.D., 1981, Florida State University. Law Clerk to the Honorable Joseph W. Hatchett,
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Professor Mildred W. Ravenell.
1. Miami Herald, May 24, 1981, § H, at 1.
2. Id.
3. BARRON's, April 27, 1981, at 27.
4. J. C. WEICHER, HOUSING: FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, 1, 2 (1980).
5. 1980 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table 892 at 539.
6. The tax deduction provided for interest on home mortgages, property taxes and other
housing-related tax breaks has been estimated at $35.3 billion, of which $19.8 billion is for
homeownership interest deductions. See Miami Herald, supra note 1.
7. BARRON'S proclaimed that the housing industry is the most pampered by Washington,
but warned that the Reagan administration intended to withdraw President Carter's pro-
posed $4.8 billion dollar jump in Federal Housing Administration guarantees, and also pro-
posed to lower the ceiling on the Government's National Mortgage Association commit-
ments from $72 billion to $64 billion. BARRON'S, supra note 3, at 9. At the same time the
administration's original budget contained a proposal to remove the tax exemption for the
interest deduction on homeownership. See Miami Herald, supra note 1, at 1.
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sidy Bond Tax Act.' The Act, which provided for amendments to
section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code,9 proposed "severe re-
strictions" on the continuation of mortgage bond programs. Never-
theless, they were hailed as necessary and as embodying modera-
tion and equity.10
Prior to the date of this change in the tax code, mortgage bonds
were relatively new, with a low level of public recognition and un-
derstanding." Although their actual share of the housing market
was small, their share of the municipal bond market was considera-
ble."2 Furthermore, in both the mortgage and municipal bond mar-
kets their growth was immediate.18 Yet, given the Congressional
political climate in the late 1970's to control the Treasury, the ter-
mination of this viable financial form was inevitable.1 4
8. Despite the claimed modest goals of the amendment, the statute actually provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in this section, any mortgage subsidy bond shall be treated
as an obligation not described in subsection (a)(1) or (2) of section 103." I.R.C. § 103A(a).
The Act's key provisions included requirements that:
(1) the residence be reasonably expected to serve as the principal residence of the mort-
gagor, I.R.C. § 103A(d).
(2) Each mortgagor must not have been a homeowner within the last three years, I.R.C.
§ 103A(e).
(3) the purchase price of each home be limited to 90 percent of the average purchase
price in the preceeding year in the SMSA in which the mortgage was placed, I.R.C. §
103A(f).
(4) the mortgage be a new mortgage and none of the bond proceeds can be used to acquire
or replace an existing mortgage, I.R.C. § 103A(j).
(5) The bond issues statewide must be limited to the greater of $200,000,000 or 9 percent
of the average of all mortgages originated in the state in the last three years, I.R.C. §
103A(g).
The Act also had special provisions for residences in "targeted" urban areas which per-
mitted a more generous allocation to blighted or troubled areas in an effort to encourage
their revitalization. Another provision permitted tax exempt status to bonds used for reha-
bilitation loans under certain circumstances. Technical provisions imposed restrictions on
arbitrage, and other provisions gave special consideration to bond issues to finance low-
income rental units.
9. Section 103(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Gross income does not include interest on-
(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the United States,
or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia.
I.R.C. § 103(a).
10. See generally, Comment, Tax Exempt Mortgage Revenue Bonds: Another Case of
"Opiate Economics"?, 11 Lov. Cm. L.J. 473 (1980).
11. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
12. During the first quarter of the year, housing bonds were providing 5% of the mort-
gage money. Wall St. J., July 18, 1979, at 33, col. 1.
13. See generally, Smith, Tax Free Housing Bonds Cost More Than They Are Worth,
FORTUNE, July 2, 1979, at 87, 88.
14. In future years, the cost to the Treasury would increase rapidly if Congress fails
to act.
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The ensuing battle, however, was unevenly waged. While the
bonds' enemies were small, coherent groups located in media and
governmental centers, the bonds' proponents and beneficiaries
were diverse and disorganized. What organization that did exist
was at local or state levels. The basic support for the bonds came
from local governments and from professional groups such as real
estate organizations. Because these groups are regulated on the lo-
cal and state level and concerned with local economics they have
only "shadow" national organization.15 Accordingly, an imbalance
in the public debate was created at the national level.
The purpose of this comment is to argue that Congress was mis-
guided in removing the exemption for housing bonds. First, it will
examine municipal bond fundamentals by providing a basic over-
view of the notion of "subsidy" and the constitutional controversy
between the states and federal government on the tax exempt sta-
tus of the bonds. Second, it will explore the structure of mortgage
finance and problems occasioned by inflation. Finally, it will criti-
cally examine the arguments utilized in passing section 103A.
Analysis will show that the logical basis as well as the substantive
proposals contained in the section are miscalculated.
II. THE NATURE OF MUNICIPAL BONDS AND THE CONCEPT OF
SUBSIDY
The term "municipal bond" generally denotes evidence of obli-
gations of municipalities, political subdivisions, states, and the ter-
ritories and possessions of the United States." The "municipality,"
in the generic sense, promises that it will pay the bondholders back
from either taxes, fees, or profits made from a project.17 Inasmuch
as bonds are generally issued to help pay for projects, such as a
new sewer system, transportation network, hospital, road, or other
... With half the market dependent on tax exempts, government would effec-
tively control the allocation of credit for housing. The prospect raises troubling
questions about whether thrift institutions, the main source of mortgage money
for homes, could survive the competition.
Id. at 87, 88.
15. See note 64, infra and accompanying text.
16. "'Municipal bonds' is a generic term encompassing the bonds issued by states, terri-
tories, possessions of the United States, municipalities and political subdivisions, and by
instrumentalities and agencies of the foregoing." Martori & Bliss, Taxation of Municipal
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public service, municipal bonds permit the governmental unit the
joy of spending without the pain of taxing."8 As a result, most state
constitutions contain provisions limiting the capacity of the state
or local governments to issue bonds without prior approval of the
affected populace. Most states have a fixed amount of debt the leg-
islature may incur. Beyond that limit, twenty-five states require a
public referendum, and twenty-four states require either a con-
stitutional amendment or a special majority of the legislature."
Bonds, therefore, present options for either the responsible use or
abuse of credit spending.20
Bonds can be classified into three broad categories based upon
what happens when the deal goes bad and the municipality is un-
able to pay. First, there are "general obligation" bonds, for which
the full faith and credit and the taxing power of the governmental
entity are pledged."' Second, there are limited obligation bonds,
known as "revenue" bonds, that pledge only the revenue from a
specific project or the proceeds of a special assessment.22 Finally,
there are "moral obligation" bonds which pretend to be revenue
bonds when they are issued to avoid constitutional debt limits and
requirements for voter approval, but have only a moral, not a legal,
18. See Comment, Voter's Right to Approve State Debt-How Much Choice is Allowed?
33 RuT. L. REv. 198 (1980); Note, Reform of the Municipal Bond Market: Alternatives to
Tax-Exempt Financing, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 233 (1979).
19. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 11, 12. For details and a discussion of the
history of state debt, see HEINS, CONSTrrUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT, 9-12
(1963); Quirk & Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known as
Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 521 (1971).
20. Local governments borrow for three reasons, two of which are generally accept-
able to bondholders and one dangerous. The first acceptable reason is to finance
long-term capital investment projects-if a locality is building a school that will
last for many years, it does not have to pay the entire bill in any one year but can
spread the cost out over the lifetime of the school by floating a long term debt.
The second acceptable reason is to smooth out seasonal fluctuations in revenues
and expenditures by short term borrowing. The final reason, which generally is
not acceptable either by a city's laws or in the eyes of bondholders, is to cover a
current account deficit.
Grumlish, The New York City Fiscal Crisis: What happened and What is to be done?.
BROOKING INSTITUTE REPRINT 319, 421-422 (1977).
21. See generally HEINS, supra note 19.
22. As one commentator has amplified:
In general, revenue bonds tend to carry higher interest costs than general obliga-
tions with comparable covenants. Presumably, this relationship exists because in-
vestors normally prefer the security of an unlimited government tax guarantee to
the specific pledge of special taxes, user charge revenues, or rental revenues which
commonly apply to revenue bonds.
HEINS, supra note 19, at 36.
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obligation to pay.28
Despite the possible risks, bondholders love municipal bonds,
since the income from them is tax free.24 The federal government,
on the other hand, dislikes "tax free" municipal bonds, since the
government claims it loses money every time a municipality issues
a bond. As a result of this "tax free" characteristic, municipal
bonds are perceived by some as a "subsidy. '25
When viewed as a "subsidy," the exemption is seen as an alter-
native method of appropriating tax money. Instead of setting up a
governmental bureaucracy to disburse tax dollars, an exemption al-
lows the individual citizen to allocate the funds by directly spend-
ing his money on those purposes Congress deems worthwhile. Ac-
cordingly, it is argued that the government has "subsidized" the
preferenced activity just as if it had first collected the dollars and
awarded them to the worthwhile project through the treasury.2 6
There is yet another way in which the tax exemption may be
thought of as a subsidy. Because the municipal bonds are tax ex-
empt on any facial rate of interest, they provide a higher rate of
return than taxable securities. Thus the tax exempt status permits
the municipality to borrow money at below-market rates. This ad-
vantage is seen as a "subsidy" for the municipality issuing the
bonds. The actual ratio of the advantage is variable, however, as a
result of the graduated or progressive nature of the tax schedule; 7
in other words, the value of the exemption to the taxpayer and the
cost to the federal government varies with the income of the tax-
payer in any given tax year.28 The issuing governments, however,
23. The obligation of a state to repay the bondholders on default may be subject to
a moral obligating clause. This type of "make up" provision is frequently added to
bond issues to make them more appealing to investors by implying that the state
is obligated in the event of default. The effect of the clause is somewhat mislead-
ing because most courts find that the clause does not create any legal liability on
the part of the state.
Comment, supra note 10, at 485-86 (footnotes omitted).
24. See Martori & Bliss, supra note 16, at 191.
25. Although most people think of a "subsidy" as a direct payment, in recent times the
term has been used to describe what happens when a taxpayer escapes paying federal taxa-
tion. See Note, supra note 1S, at 243-44.
26. See Gabinet, The Municipal Bond Interest Exemption: Comments on a Running
Battle, 24 CAsE W. Ras. L. REv. 64, 73 (1972); Martori & Bliss, supra note 16, at 213.
27. Broadly speaking there are three alternatives for tax schedules: proportional, pro-
gressive and regressive. "Progressive taxation is now regarded as one of the central ideas of
modern democratic capitalism and is widely accepted as a secure policy commitment which
does not require serious examination." Martori & Bliss, supra note 16, at 211-12. See gener-
ally Gabinet, supra note 26.
28. Given that the value of a tax exempt bond is dependent on an individual's taxable
1981]
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must pay higher interest rates than one would expect, given the
advantage they receive, because the number of high income tax-
payers is limited. The resulting increase in borrowing costs, a situ-
ation termed "leakage," 2 substantially reduces the benefit of the
tax exemption to the issuing governments, while increasing the
revenue losses to the federal government. Critics of this situation
brand it "inefficient" because the state and local governments do
not really save in borrowing costs the amounts which the federal
income level, investors will select municipal bonds with a lower facial rate of return than
standard commercial offerings if the after tax return on the commercial bond proves to be
lower than the facial rate of the tax-free bond.
As a practical matter, it is unclear who benefits from the tax exemption because the ma-
jority of bondholders are not private individuals but financial institutions who pass the tax
exemption benefits on to their customers.
The majority of municipal bonds are held by commercial banks and by fire and
casualty insurance companies, both relatively competitive industries. It is likely
that benefits derived from owning municipal securities are passed on to customers.
Consequently, it can be assumed that an increase in the effective tax rate caused
by a change in the tax-exempt status of municipals would be shifted forward to
customers, who would bear the actual incidence of the tax. Since customers of
banks and insurance companies include everyone from the lowest to the highest
income levels, it would be difficult to conclude that any inequity results from large
institutional holdings of municipal securities.
Note, supra note 18, at 248 (footnotes omitted).
Although there has been some shift in the mix of holders over the last decade, the basic
pattern of large institutional holders has remained dominant; the percentage of bonds held
by large institutions which spread the tax benefit over a range of brackets has remained
constant at about 60%. For a discussion of the precise percentages that large institutional
holders utilize municipal bonds, see id., at 238, n.37.
29. See Surrey, Tax Incentives As a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HAIRv. L. Rv. 705 (1970).
Mussa and Kormendi have argued that bond holders pay a higher rate of taxation than
similarly situated taxpayers in their bracket, and that the bonds are more like a case of
revenue osmosis, than a case of revenue "leakage." This can be understood through an anal-
ysis of the impact of inflation on long term investments. At inflation rates as modest as 4%
to 6%, an effective tax rate of as high as 111% to 141% can result from holding municipal
bonds.
The magnitude of this distortion is proportional to the investor's nominal tax rate
and, therefore, is greatest for those in the highest tax brackets. Moreover, the
distortionary effect of inflation on the taxation of interest income is far greater
than on income from equity assets or from wages and salaries .... This means
that the real implicit tax rate paid by holders of municipal bonds increases as a
result of inflation. This real implicit tax rate is the proportionate differential be-
tween the real yield on taxable bonds and the real yield on municipal bonds of
comparable quality. This sacrifice of real yield by investors in municipal bonds
accrues as a direct financial benefit to the state and local governments issuing the
bonds.
M. MussA & R. KORMENDI, THz TAXATION OF MuNIciPAL Boms 62 (1979). By identifying
the differential in yields produced by inflation as an implicit tax, Mussa and Kormendi have
attacked a critical soft spot in the subsidy argument's equity case. If this differential is an
implicit tax, the bondholders may end up paying more than their fair share.
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government gives up in lost revenues. In this light, the federal gov-
ernment is perceived as being unable to control its own budget,
and thus lacking the fiscal integrity to effectively carry out its
policies.30
These "subsidy" arguments, however, fail to account fully for
what their proponents view as permission granted to the wealthy
to pay in an alternative method. Furthermore, no empirical data
have been offered to indicate that preference programs are less ef-
fective than regularly appropriated programs.3'
The concept of "subsidy" can be further explored by comparing
what happens when a tax preference is awarded with what hap-
pens when direct revenue sharing occurs. In revenue sharing, the
federal government initially taxes, and then spends by allocating
the money to the states for various purposes. In the case of a tax
preference, the process of revenue sharing is streamlined. Instead
of the federal government collecting and giving the money to the
states, the government authorizes the states to collect it directly
from the taxpayers. The government then adjusts the tax account
of the citizen through the use of the exemption to show that the
tax has already been paid. In the federal government's view, then,
it has subsidized the state bond issue by paying a portion of the
interest. This creates the problem of determining whether the tax-
payer has paid the tax to the federal or state government. Since
the "subsidy" notion is a federal tax policy analytical tool, it is
generally assumed that the tax and allocation of funds which oc-
curs is an incident of federal taxation. Applying the same alternate
tax analysis, however, it can be seen that the state equally "taxes"
the bond, since the difference between the market rate and the fa-
cial rate of the tax exempt bond could be viewed as a tax paid to
the state.32
30. For a description of the government's inability to control fiscal policy, see Bittker, A
"Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, in PoLIcy RLEADiNGs IN INI-
VmUAL TAXATION 84 (1980).
31. The general argument against preference programs relates to the so-called ineffi-
ciency of the tax collection mechanism and not to the program results. For a critical re-
evaluation of these claims, see M. MussA & R. KORaa.NDi, supra note 29.
Gabinet doubts the integrity of the efficiency argument, asserting that the distinction is
not between efficient and inefficient but between "tight" and "loose" control programs; with
each program requiring separate analysis such that no safe generalized comment can be
made on the efficiency of "tight" or "loose" controls. See Gabinet, supra note 26, at 80.
32. Analytically, this could leave a gap between the presumed rate of state taxation and
the actual but exempted rate of federal taxation. In theory, this provides a measure of both
presumed inefficiency and tax avoidance. See M. MussA & R. KoRamsaii, supra note 29, at
19.
1981]
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If these municipal bonds are so troublesome, why has the federal
government remained in the background? The answer lies in the
nature of the federal system, as there are constitutional limits on
the ability of the federal government to tax the states. This doc-
trine, known as "reciprocal" or "intergovernmental" immunity,
was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in Indian
Motocycle Co. v. United States:33
It is an established principle of our constitutional system of
dual government that the instrumentalities, means and opera-
tions whereby the United States exercises its governmental pow-
ers are exempt from taxation by the States, and that the instru-
mentalities, means and operations whereby the States exert the
governmental powers belonging to them are equally exempt from
taxation by the United States. This principle is implied from the
independence of the national and state governments within their
respective spheres and from the provisions of the Constitution
which look to the maintenance of the dual system.3
State and local officials, accordingly, can conveniently use the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity as their prime defense
33. 283 U.S. 570 (1931).
34. Id. at 575.
The doctrine originated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in
which Chief Justice John Marshall found the State of Maryland could not levy a tax on the
bank notes of the Second Bank of the United States because the bank was an instrumental-
ity of the United States. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on
rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), the Court extended the doctrine to protect the interest from
municipal bonds from federal taxation under the Revenue Act of 1894.
The sixteenth amendment was passed in response to the second prong of Pollock which
held the Revenue Act unconstitutional because it failed to apportion the income tax among
the states. The amendment was to remove the apportionment requirement but not to ex-
tend the government's power to tax. In early decisions the Court held that to "tax the in-
come from securities is to tax securities themselves," National Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
277 U.S. 508, 521 (1928). But by 1937 the Court began to define new limits for the applica-
tion of the doctrine. The Court would permit taxation which neither precludes nor threatens
unreasonably to obstruct any function essential to the continued existence of the state. But,
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court reaffirmed the doctrine
of intergovernmental immunity and used the logic of vital functions to declare unconstitu-
tional a congressional attempt to extend federal wage and hour standards to municipalities.
For an exposition on the impact of Usery, see Keohane, The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax
Act of 1979: An Unwarranted Attack on State Sovereignty, 8 FORDHAM URi. L.J. 483, 504
(1980).
For an extensive history and alternative analysis, see Comment, Tax-Exempt State and
Local Bonds: Form of Intergovernmental Immunity and Form of Intergovernmental Obli-
gation, 21 DE PAuL L. REV. 757 (1972); Comment, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities: An
Analysis and Suggested Approach to the Doctrine and Its Application to State and Muni-
cipal Bond Interest, 15 VILL. L. REv. 414 (1970); Gabinet, supra note 26.
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against federal attempts to tax the bonds." Thus, if the bonds are
simply beyond the reach of the federal taxing power,86 the exemp-
tion contained in section 103 of the tax code cannot be viewed as a
"subsidy."3 7
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE LENDING
Prior to the Great Depression, a home buyer would typically
make a 50% downpayment to get a five-year mortgage with little
or no amortization.3 8 The Depression, however, crumbled the free
market system of banking and mortgage lending." In response to
the financial collapse, the government created a federally regulated
and insured system of banking with the dual goals of protecting
depositors and providing liquidity of funds;40 at the same time, the
system was designed to revitalize the housing industry and to pro-
tect homeowners from foreclosure. This governmental mechanism,
which encouraged long-term fixed interest mortgages, functioned
extremely well for decades, as money was plentiful for housing."'
35. See generally Keohane, supra note 34.
36. But the very presence of an "exemption" in the Internal Revenue Code has pre-
vented this question from reaching the Supreme Court. This is because the case and contro-
versy requirement prevents the Court from answering merely theoretical questions. Con-
gress gave the courts an opportunity to review this matter when it amended the Internal
Revenue Code to preclude a tax exemption for industrial development bonds. See Note,
supra note 18, at 248. But no federal court has considered Congress's constitutional right to
tax the bonds; instead, the courts have merely ruled on which bonds are industrial develop-
ment bonds. Nor is it likely that the courts will attempt a definitive solution, since the
problem cuts to the heart of the very complex relation between the states, and between the
states and the federal government.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) the United States Supreme
Court imposed limits on the power of the federal government to regulate state or local gov-
ernment activity. Although the Usery argument concerned the extent of the commerce
power, any consideration of the municipal issue must also consider the federal government's
right to control its own fiscal affairs. See note 34 supra. In such a balancing analysis the
court might well weigh the interests as equal, or it might choose to ignore the matter and
permit it to be resolved by the interested parties politically.
37. The "subsidy" argument is based on the presumption that the income is initially a
valid object of taxation. But if the federal government is constitutionally prohibited from
taxing the income at all, it is impossible to consider any alternative methods of imposing the
tax-thus the bond tax exemption cannot be considered a "subsidy." For a discussion out-
lining the arguments for the elimination of the municipal bond interest exemption, see
Gabinet, supra note 26, at 99-100.
38. See BARRO'S, supra note 3, at 24.
39. P. HENDERSON & K. VILLANI, REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE HOUSING FINANCE SYS-
TEM (1977).
40. Id. at 2.
41. The system required a plethora of restrictions on portfolios of "thrifts," the major
source of mortgage money. "Thrifts," or "mutual savings banks," were originally known as
1981]
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Thus, regulations replaced market forces since printed fiats, and
not the invisible hand, directed the thrifts. Standard payment
long-term home mortgages for assets and short-term deposits for
liabilities became the financial paradigm. ' Because the system
could only function when there was a relatively low rate of infla-
tion, this structure functioned with remarkable efficiency until
about 1965 when interest rates became unstable.43
Due to the staggering impact of inflation on the traditional
structure of thrift institutions, the federal housing finance struc-
ture was in serious trouble by the late 1970's." In an attempt to
balance income with liabilities, the thrifts took a number of inno-
vative, yet misguided, solutions. The most obvious was to raise the
interest rates on the mortgages it issued. This permitted the thrift
to offer an attractive rate of interest to investors. Unfortunately, it
also drove up the cost of homeownership and priced many families
out of the market.45 In addition, it was a very limited remedy be-
cause most of the mortgages in the portfolio were issued previously
at lower rates.
Another attempt by the thrifts to solve this problem was to pre-
clude the assumption of existing mortgages and to seek authoriza-
tion to issue new forms of mortgages which afford interest rates
which vary up or down over time.46 These reforms, however, cir-
"five cents savings banks," a nickname reflecting their emphasis on small deposits. For an
historical discussion of the banking institution, see id.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. at 2. The causes of inflation in our times are too complex to be dealt with in this
comment. Generally, however, the author perceives inflation as a condition of too many dol-
lars chasing too few goods. Under the conventional analysis, current inflation is traced to the
"guns and butter" policy of the Johnson Administration, in which the effort of the federal
government to fund the enormous expenses of the war in Viet Nam and the anti-poverty
social programs at home was not backed by an appropriate level of taxation. The govern-
ment borrowed money in competition with the private sector to make up the revenue short
fall. This competition triggered the inflationary spiral which has been maintained subse-
quent to the Johnson domestic and foreign policies by the unwillingness of government to
deal with the problems of spending.
44. Savings and loans, which make 75% of the mortgage loans, reported a net loss of
$890 million. For 1980, the Home Loan Bank Board estimated that 52% of the nation's
thrift institutions were operating at a loss because their portfolios of long term loans were
yielding under 9% while the cost of funds was 8.94%, a return on assets of approximately
0.1% in the second half of the year. It has been reported for 1980, that one third of the
savings and loans operated at a loss. See BARRON'S, supra note 3, at 9.
45. "Thrift institutions have to pay higher interest rates to savers to prevent the deposit
out flow from becoming a hemorrhage. The thrifts have to pass on their higher costs by
raising mortgage interest rates, and at the current national average of 13 per cent, many
potential home buyers find the price too high." NzwswEmz, Jan. 28, 1980, at 62.
46. Tallahassee Democrat, April 19, 1981, § D, at 1, col. 3.
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cumvent the fundamental purpose of the traditional mortgage
system, inasmuch as the federal structure was designed to make
homeownership possible to the widest number of persons and to
stimulate the housing industry as a vital sector of the economy.
47
In addition to the problems posed by inflation, the thrifts were
hard-pressed by new non-banking, non-regulated investment
forms, such as money market funds. These funds and the growing
assertiveness of certain investment firms were remolding the very
environment of banking at an historic rate.46 Money market funds,
which did not exist a few years ago, had assets of $118 billion by
mid-1981.4 9 Furthermore, foreign banks had increased their assets
from $24 billion to $200 billion in less than ten years.50
It was in this era of sweeping change that the housing bonds
were offered by the cities. Not only were the bonds capable of in-
flicting near-fatal wounds on the troubled thrifts, but they were
also the creature of the hated new money institutions.51
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF MORTGAGE REVENUE BONDS AND THE
RESPONSE BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Governmental involvement in the field of housing has been
lengthy, sporadic, and somewhat superficial.' Large scale efforts,
starting after the Depression, 8 included the creation of the mort-
gage finance forms and the exploitation of various tax preferences.
These developments, coupled with the deductions for interest on
mortgages and real estate taxes, became acute when the federal
government increased income taxes to help pay for World War II;
at this time, the impact of federal taxation on the average citizen
became much greater." Since the War, tax policy has encouraged
and developed decent housing." Again, the major tax contribution
47. See P. HDENDEsHorr & K. VAij.s, supra note 39. For a discussion of the current
status of the housing industry, see Wall St. J., July 31, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
48. William C. Butcher, Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, warned that America's
banks were on the "perilous side of the fault line." He called the current system of regula-
tion an "archaic structure that has abetted the declining efficiency of the United States in
world markets" and he predicted that system's demise. Butcher, Upheaval in Financial
Services, Wall St. J., May 15, 1981, at 34, col. 4.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See FORTUNz, supra note 13, at 87-88.
52. See Keohane, supra note 34, at 484-87.
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was in the form of interest deductions for mortgages, and deduc-
tions for various state real estate taxes.5 Thus, homeownership
was preferable to renting.5 7
Starting in 1970, when New York adopted a program of mort-
gage assistance patterned after similar national programs," state
and local governments issued bonds exempt under the provisions
of Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code. The mortgage bonds
met little opposition at first, apparently because they were small
issues; Congress even amended housing legislation to encourage use
of the bonds.' But in 1978, when the city of Chicago issued $100
million in housing bonds, a revolution was underway.
By the end of 1978, housing bonds were 25% of the municipal
bond market. 0 It was predicted that by the mid-1980's, 50% of the
housing financed in the United States would be supported by
housing bonds. 1 Such speculation sent tremors through the thrifts.
Already hard pressed by inflation and novel competition from new
investment forms, the thrifts appealed to Congress to ban the
bonds. The bond approach was a double threat to the thrifts, since
bonds could offer higher adjusted returns to investors while at the
same time offering long-term low interest rates to borrowers.
Congress's emerging concern at this time was with the continued
drain on the Treasury. The prospects for the Treasury were dis-
quieting, as a revenue loss of $470 million was projected for 1981,
56. See Miami Herald, supra note 1, § H, at 8.
57. See id. See generally A. DowNs, PuBLIc PoLic AND THE RISING COST OF HOUSING
(1978).
58. See Keohane, supra note 34, at 486.
59. "State housing agencies have issued tax exempt bonds for single family homes for
approximately ten years without much opposition from the United States Treasury." Ram-
speck, Single Family Mortgage Financing, in MumcEAL BorDS 1980 13 (Practicing Law
Institute Handbook 1980). Prior to the 1980 amendment, I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A) provided an
exemption from the ban on industrial development bonds for bonds issued to finance "resi-
dential real property for family units." Section 103(b)(4)(A) as amended limited that
exemption to
projects for residential rental property if each obligation issued pursuant to the
issue is in registered form and if-
(i) 15 percent or more in the case of targeted area projects, or
(ii) 20 percent or more in the case of any other project,
of the units in each project are to be occupied by individuals of low or moderate
income (within the meaning of section 167(k)(3)(B)).
(emphasis added).
60. Bonds of $2.2 billion were issued by the close of 1978. In the first quarter of 1979,
$3.3 billion in bonds were issued as long-term tax-exempt instruments; by year's end, 28%
of the long-term bonds were issued as tax-exempt by the nation's state and local govern-
mental units. See id.
61. FORTUNE, supra note 13, at 87.
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with the dollar amount expected to reach $11 billion by 1984.
Major conflicts over the powers of states to issue bonds have
been recurrent since the passage of the federal tax code. Nine
times in this century Congress has considered amendments to Sec-
tion 103. Only twice have the previous efforts succeeded. These in-
cluded the efforts to remove arbitrage bonds and industrial devel-
opment bonds from the Section 103 exemption. These bonds were
presumed to be beyond the constitutional ban on taxing govern-
mental obligations because the state is presumed to be involved in
a commercial and not governmental operation when it issues
them.62
It was in this atmosphere that the future of the thrifts was
linked with Congress's concern for fiscal integrity. Legislation pro-
posing a ban on bonds was introduced. The now oft-repeated argu-
ments about "subsidy" and "leakage" were dusted off and drafted
into service to once again obscure the true issues at stake: Whether
the thrifts were at all viable under the current economic situations
and whether long-term low interest financing, essential to
widescale homeownership, could be provided.
Unfortunately, Congress ignored these issues. The author be-
lieves that this failure to face the problems of the thrifts was be-
cause few, if any, in national policy circles considered long-term
inflation or high interest rates possible; in other words, since it
would take an extended period of inflation and high interest rates
to damage the structure of mortgage finance in the country, it did
not appear to be a pressing contemporary problem.
Although political leaders appeared determined to speak of that
happy day when interest rates and inflation would return to nor-
mal, state and local governments identified housing finance as a
critical area of public concern and began to devise various methods
to take advantage of the tax exemption contained in Section 103."
Basically, state and local governments responded to the crisis with
the view that the housing market is only a collection of local mar-
kets." As homeowners and their proxy representational groups,
62. Comment: The Taxability of State and Local Bond Interest by the Federal Govern-
ment, 38 CIN. L. REv. 703 (1969). For a thorough discussion of industrial development and
arbitrage bonds, see Comment, Tax-Exempt State and Local Bonds: Form of Intergovern-
mental Immunity and Form of Intergovernmental Obligation, 21 DE PAUL L. Ri'. 757
(1972).
63. See N. BErHUN, HOUSING FINANCE AGENCIES: A COMPARISON BETwEEN STATES AND
HUD (1976). See generally Keohane, supra note 52, at 47.
64. The overriding fact about the housing market in this country is that there is
really no such thing. Rather there are housing markets, each largely independent
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such as real estate salesmen and developers, are better organized
on the local level, local and state governments become responsive
to the needs of their areas and capable of crafting programs quick-
ly to meet that need. Furthermore, local governments perceived
homeownership as not being effectively organized on a national
level.6" Thus, the local officials felt that they had a greater aware-
ness of the problems.
V. SECTION 103A: ITS MIsGUmED UNDERPINNINGS
The initial task of Congress in passing the Mortgage Subsidy
Bond Tax Act of 1980, which limits mortgage subsidy bonds to 9%
of the average volume of mortgages in a state for the prior 3 years,
or $200 million," was to define which bonds would be banned and
which would not. Congress answered that "any mortgage subsidy
bond shall be treated as an obligation not described in subsection
(a)(1) or (2) of section 103. ''67 The new Section 103A, then, im-
poses requirements for bonds which will be exempt from the ban.
The first requirments, which are somewhat neutral and very simi-
lar to those contained in the typical local bond program, include
the requirement that the mortgage be on the principal residence of
the mortgagor and within the jurisdiction that issues the bonds."
Other requirements, however, are innovative and designed to ei-
ther limit the growth of bonds per se, limit their competition with
the thrifts, or define the groups Congress hopes to benefit from the
bonds."
The Act provides a three-year requirement which prohibits the
of others in different localities. Within each housing market there are various sub-
markets, many of which are also nearly independent of one another, in the sense
that a prospective buyer in one submarket would not consider a dwelling in other
submarkets. Thus one market might be based on structure (single-family vs.
apartment or row houses), another on tenure (owner-occupancy vs. rental), still
another on the value or rental rates (low income, middle-income, or high-income),
and finally one on locational criteria (type of neighborhood being sought).
H. WOLMAN, PoLrTIcs oF FEDERAL HoUSING 22-23 (1971).
65. Dahl may be correct in asserting that America is a pluralistic democracy in which
"there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make
itself heard effectively at some crucial state in the process of decision." But, this assumes
that the group is organized and active, and in the case of homeowners this has not been true
because of the general failure to recognize the potential impact of national policy. See R.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOcRATIc THEORY 145 (1956).
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use of bond funds to aid anyone who has owned a home in the past
three years.70 Although the provision is intended to aid first time
home owners, it also prohibits the rollover of high interest loans,71
which limits the versatility of bonds in helping families to relocate
to new areas. Many families could not afford their current homes if
they were forced to relocate and finance homes in new areas at the
prevailing rate. Inflation has so deflated their prospects that even
with high equity and a large downpayment many families would be
unable to relocate and continue with homeownership. This creates
a situation where bonds cannot be used to help attract middle-
level managers and technicians to a community by providing an
adequate supply of housing at a reasonable cost.
This provision, however, does not apply to "targeted" areas.72
Thus the exemption may lead to a physical regeneration of some
inner city areas; but it may also contribute greatly to the process
known as gentrification, the return of the middle class to the urban
core. The problem with gentrification is that it encourages higher
income people to compete with lower income people for the availa-
ble low income housing stock. While this results in the physical
restoration of the area, its cost is the conversion of modestly priced
home rentals into the comfortable living quarters of the middle
class. This in turn promotes overcrowding and subsequent degen-
eration of adjacent urban areas. The provisions of the bond sub-
sidy tax act serve as a blueprint for gentrification. This becomes
more disturbing because other provisions make gentrification even
more attractive. Once the "targeted" area home is purchased,
mortgage bond money can be used to make both home improve-
ment and rehabilitation loans. This combination amounts to a
"subsidy" for the process of destroying lower income homes in the
city. They may be physically restored, but socioeconomically this
measure could devastate the available housing stock for modest in-
come families. Since the median home in America costs about
$62,500, with the average about $56,000, it is unlikely that this
measure will prevent many middle class families from participating
in the program." Only families solidly in that category can afford
70. Id.
71. Id. at (j)(2).
72. I.R.C. § 103A(e)(2)(A).
73. The legislative history of Section 103A clearly demonstrates that the drafters' inten-
tion was to preclude just such a situation from occurring.
(1) Limitations targeting subsidy to individuals and areas of greatest need
The Committee believes that the individuals who have the greatest need for the
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homes at 15% to 17% interest rates. 4
In any event, Congress provided three reasons for removing the
exemption for housing bonds.75 First, there was a primal urge to
protect the treasury. Federal officials saw the bonds as raids on the
federal treasury, while congressional critics tended to view them as
unauthorized and uncontrolled appropriations.76  Second, there
were the equity objections to the bonds, in that they helped the
wrong people." The theme basically is a variation on the notion of
welfare for the rich. Third, there were objections to mortgage reve-
nue bonds on the basis that they are inefficient. As Smith has
charged: "[S]ome 15 percent of each issue goes to pay underwrit-
ers', lawyers', and other fees and to provide a financial reserve. ' 78
This reasoning ignores several factors. First, the equity objection
is invalid, inasmuch as some higher income buyers must be in the
pool of mortgagors in order to insure that the bonds are financially
sound. Furthermore, many persons of modest means have been
forced into higher income brackets by inflation alone and not an
increase in actual wealth. Finally, the equity objection does not
subsidy are those of low or moderate income who have difficulty obtaining mort-
gage money and who are purchasing their first home. In addition, the Committee
believes that it is appropriate to assist certain areas of chronic economic distress.
Accordingly, Title IX contains a number of requirements to target the subsidy
towards this group of individuals and certain distressed areas.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5526, 5810.
74. Lower cost housing might be available through town houses or condo-style projects.
But this could result in a wave of condo conversion subsidized by mortgage bonds.
75. Representative Ullman in his attack on the bonds' tax exempt status accused them
of subverting the goals of national housing policy. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976). (Since the
passage of the National Housing Act of 1949, the nation had adopted the goal of a "decent
home, and a suitable living environment for every American family.")
In his arguments against the tax exempt status of housing bonds, Representative Ullman
asserted: "The primary goal of Federal housing policy has been to provide shelter for low
income families." 125 Cong. Rec. H 2349 (daily ed. April 25, 1979). This is somewhat at
odds, however, with the functioning of that program which resulted in the construction of 26
million housing units, of which only 6 million were earmarked for low or moderate income
families. See Keohane, supra note 34, at 45.
The Ways and Means Chairman also argued that federal revenue loss occurred. Finally,
he argued that the programs were a misallocation of "federal" resources, as he apparently
viewed the tax exempt bonds as diverting "federal dollars" without the benefits of the ap-
propriations process or federal management. "[Ilt amounts to a subsidized housing program
with no exercise of any judgment or restraint over the use of the funds by either the admin-
istration or Congress." 125 Cong. Rec. H 2349 (daily ed. April 25, 1979).
76. See FoRTruN, supra note 13, at 86-87.
77. Typical of programs under attack was the mortgage bond program in Chicago which
permitted maximum incomes of $40,000 a year. See Comment, supra note 10, at 495-96
n.129.
78. See FoRTuNE, supra note 13, at 88.
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properly view homeownership as an investment strategy. So-called
semi-luxurious homes often are merely those which appreciate
faster and permit families to protect their investment; besides,
many of the high income homes are merely modest structures
greatly driven up in price by inflation. Second, the inefficiency ob-
jection ignores the nature of capital reserves as the single largest
expense associated with the issuance of bonds. State law requires
that a certain percentage of the bond sale proceeds be held in "re-
serve." Instead of being expended on the program, these funds are
retained as protection against contingencies. These requirements
help induce bondholders to buy, and provide a measure of safety
to the bond issuer. Without the reserve feature, it might be neces-
sary to pay higher rates of interest to induce bondholders to accept
the risk implicit in revenue bonds. Thus, this "safety net" feature
of bonds is not inefficient or wasteful, but a prudential expense.7 9
Third, the reasoning overlooks the goal of mortgage bonds as pro-
viding for mortgages whose interest is lower than regular commer-
cial sources.80
As a result of the faulty reasoning employed in passing Section
103A, Congress's efforts against the bonds have not saved the
thrifts. Instead, Congress intervened with precisely the wrong re-
sponse at a pivotal moment. During the eighteen-month period
that Congress debated the bond tax reform, the very uncertainty of
the reform exercised a death hold on bond activity. 1 It did not aid
the thrifts, because their problems related to the swiftness of a
revolution in the money and banking area and not to municipali-
ties issuing bonds. It is the established pattern of short-term obli-
gations and long-term low interest assets which is the core of the
problem. This structure cannot perform in a highly inflationary
era. Under the traditional model, in times of high inflation, the
cost of new money will always exceed the rate of established in-
come from the portfolio. Thus only by radically changing the na-
ture of the mortgage, or abandoning this area altogether can thrifts
survive long-term inflation."
79. "Although the investor carries the risk of default, the actual risk is minimal. The
pool of mortgage loans and a reserve account provide adequate security for the issue." Com-
ment, supra note 10, at 492.
80. See BmUN, supra note 63.
81. See FORTUNE, supra note 13, at 87.
82. In March, 1981, alone, 114 S & L's were placed on the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation's problem list-this brought the total to 246, an increase of 86%.
The Wall Street Journal reported, "The agency concedes that 120 may be left with little or
no net worth by year-end and that another 100 could be in the same fix by 1982." Wall St.
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Therefore, the problem was structural and not occasional. Pro-
posed remedies to the troubled situation of the thrifts included au-
thorization for United States Treasury loans up to $3 billion as
opposed to a current level of $750 million.8 3 In addition, another
proposed remedy for bailing out the locals was by selling off mar-
ket entry rights to large banking corporations in major market cen-
ters." The regulators were even willing to consider major changes
in the system including steps which could lead to a national bank-
ing system.8 5
Furthermore, taking away the exemption is not apt to prevent
either a revenue loss to the Treasury or distortion in the propor-
tionality of the tax base, inasmuch as high bracket tax payers will
most likely merely transfer their investments to other tax shelters.
In the absence of a bond tax exemption for mortgages, the overall
revenue lost will still be determined by the tax avoidance policy of
high bracket tax payers, who will merely switch their investments
to the shelter of other tax code provisions.
The drive against the mortgage bond tax exemption also failed
to consider the economic alternative to the long-term low interest
bond financing presented by the mortgage bonds. The alternative
has proven to be a highly volatile market of ever escalating interest
rates for mortgages. Since the introduction of the Mortgage Bond
Tax Act in 1979, mortgage interest rates have increased by almost
50%, from 12 or 13% to about 18%. Every dime of that increase is
tax deductible. Even more disturbing is that much of that new in-
terest debt is under new mortgage forms which vary over time.
Thus, the Treasury has exchanged the predictability of an estab-
lished rate of debt for long periods for unpredictable losses tied to
economic indicators. In an era of ever increasing inflation, this
means the Treasury has exchanged a stated low level of loss (the
low facial rate of the bonds), for an ever increasing high level of
loss (the ever escalating variable interest on mortgages and escalat-
ing rates on certificates of deposit).
The Bond Tax reform has also created, on a practical level, two
tax exemptions where there was once one, and thus doubled the
likelihood of loss to the Treasury. While the high income tax payer
J., May 21, 1981, at 1, col. 6. Meanwhile, the Home Loan Bank Board chairman warned
Congress that, "We are at a point... where truly significant increments of assistance must
come from Congress." Id.
83. See Wall St. J., supra note 81.
84. See id.
85. See id.
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will continue to shelter his income by shifting it to other shelter
provisions, lower bracket taxpayers will find themselves faced with
the burden of high interest rates, a burden at least partially light-
ened by the mortgage interest exemption. Thus, the government
has merely imposed the burden of high interest rates on lower in-
come taxpayers, while suffering a loss by definition greater than
that of the bond interest deduction. This occurs because the new
debt has variable interest which will increase over time, causing
greater Treasury losses. Further, it cannot be assumed that inter-
est rates will go down, as banks would not issue variable interest
mortgages if they expected interest rates to decline.
Through the logic of an alternate tax, the Mortgage Tax Act can
be seen as a shifting of the incident of taxation from high income
taxpayers (thrifts) to lower bracket homeowners, since the ultimate
beneficiaries of mortgage bonds are not just the cities but the
mortgagors as well. Accordingly, a new implied federal tax burden
imposed through high interest rates is placed on lower bracket tax-
payers. This violates the cardinal rules of tax equity, and distorts
the proportionality of the tax base.
An apparent casualty of the financial disarray was the long-term
fixed interest mortgage, which, for almost half a century, had been
the stable backbone of the American system of home finance. With
these rapid changes come prospects which could shock the roots of
the American economic order if not properly diverted. 6 Despite a
drop in the prices in the housing market, over which the Federal
officials were overjoyed, this contribution to fighting inflation is
mostly illusory in impact. One of the reasons that the selling price
was increasing at a rate slower than the Consumer Price Index was
that the housing component is a crucial factor in the Consumer
Price Index.87 In addition, it was the Fed's high interest rates
which were both pricing families out of the market and driving up
the monthly cost of owning a home. Thus, this situation repre-
sented a loss and not a gain to the consumer.
86. By April, 1981, BARRON'S was reporting a near glacial change in the structure of
America's housing market. See BARRON'S, supra note 3. The report concluded that
"[rieports of the death of the long-term, fixed-rate mortgage may be exaggerated, but
because of raging inflation and attendant uncertainties, no institution can afford to write
them." Id. at 25.
87. The Consumer Price Index, somewhat more realistically than the Fed, does not look
to selling price but to the monthly expenditure for mortgage payments and other similar
costs to determine the cost of living.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A central concern of legislation should be a system which pro-
vides for homeownership. In the face of a financial crisis caused by
skyrocketing inflation, the federal government has failed to articu-
late a clear and forcible policy that will secure the dream of home-
ownership for millions. Instead, it has given in to requests which
have only aggravated the situation and delayed any organized con-
sideration for reform of the housing finance structure. Despite the
federal government's shortsightedness, the states and localities
were responding well to the needs of the people; their efforts, how-
ever, were aborted by the Congressional action on the Bond Tax
Act. Because the situation has continued to deteriorate, reconsid-
eration is inevitable. At that time, the central issue of discussion
should be how to restore long-term, relatively low interest financ-
ing, within the framework of a federal system which encourages
mass homeownership.
